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Abstract. To access services on the Web, users need quite often to have ac-
counts, i.e. user names and passwords. This becomes a problem when the num-
ber of accounts keeps increasing at the same time password is a very weak form 
of authentication exposing the users to fraud and abuses. To address both men-
tioned issues we propose a Mobile Universal identity, which by combining In-
ternet identifiers with mobile identifiers is capable of delivering strong authen-
tication for Internet services. By introducing an identity provider, the solution 
enables the user to employ the Mobile Universal identity for multiple service 
providers. By federation with other identities, Mobile Universal identity can be 
used with service providers worldwide. 
Keywords: Identity management; strong authentication; identity federation; 
mobile identity; mobile ID 
1 Introduction 
In the current digital age the Internet or more precisely the World Wide Web, is play-
ing a central role in most individual’s life. The preponderant position is probably due 
the immense number of fancy and diverse services that everyone can access and en-
joy. However, in order to get granted access to services users are quite often required 
to create an account with an identity, i.e. to define a user name and a password at the 
service provider. As the number of identities, i.e. user names and passwords is in-
creasing it is more and more challenging for users to remember them. Most critical is 
the weakness of passwords as authentication scheme. Indeed, passwords are exposed 
to cracking, sniffing, phishing, spoofing, etc. which can lead to identity theft and oth-
er serious economic consequences both for the user and the service provider. Stronger 
authentication is urgently required.   
Contrastingly, in the mobile network, mobile users enjoy of the great protection all 
over the world thanks to by the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module), a tamper resistant 
device which hosts the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and is 
equipped with advanced cryptographic functions, is capable of carrying strong au-
thentication towards the mobile network. In this paper we propose a new user identity, 
called Mobile Universal identity, which combines mobile identity and Internet identi-
ty to provide a strong and uniform authentication for access of both mobile and Inter-
net services. The paper starts with a brief review of related works. Next is the investi-
gation of identities and authentication in the Internet. The strong authentication used 
in the mobile network is examined thoroughly. The main part of the paper is the de-
scription of the proposed Mobile Universal identity. 
2 Related works 
There were previously proposed some solutions which make use of the SIM card to 
provide stronger authentication to Internet applications and services. The 3GPP GBA 
(Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) [1] authentication enables the usage of the 
USIM/ISIM (IMS SIM) authentication for other Internet application clients than the 
IMS client such as email client, IM client, presence client, etc. Basically, the GBA 
provides a mechanism for establishing a short-term authentication key between a 
client on the user equipment and a service provider.  Unfortunately GBA only applies 
to USIM/ISIM and not the regular SIM. The second and probably the most serious 
limitation lies on the fact that GBA requires the presence of the GBA client on the 
mobile phone, which is quite difficult because handset manufacturers do not have 
incentive to implement it. To remedy the situation the Eureka Mobicome project pro-
posed a few solutions called SIM strong authentication that provides strong authenti-
cation from a regular browser on a regular mobile phone carrying a regular GSM SIM 
[2][3]. Unfortunately, as their names suggest, the described solutions are focusing 
only on providing stronger authentications and do not constitute a complete identity 
system offering strong and user-friendly authentication to the users. 
 
3 Identities and authentication on the Internet 
In the Internet or more correctly the World Wide Web users can access a lot of infor-
mation but to receive really useful and validated documents and services they usually 
need to have an account at the service provider. Such an account is tied to an identity, 
characterized by a user name and a password locally defined at the service provider 
Web site. As the number of identities increases the burden to remember the passwords 
is getting heavier for users. To address this problem Identity Providers (IDP) such as 
Facebook connect [4], Google ID [5], Twitter [6], etc. start to emerge and offer the 
usage of their identities at other Web sites. This makes it easier for both the users and 
Web sites. Unfortunately there still is a big problem. Passwords are still too weak 
authentication and the risk to be abused is still there. 
To improve security some players like Google, Apple, etc. introduced two step au-
thentication or more precisely two factor authentication in which the first factor pass-
word i.e. something you know is complemented with a second factor, the mobile 
phone, i.e. something you have. Upon sign on the user receives a one-time code in an 
SMS (Short Message Service) that he/she has to type in. This authentication, although 
stronger, could be challenging when the user is accessing through his mobile phone 
with smaller screen and keyboard. Lately, there are emerging software security tokens 
i.e. software application capable of carrying out strong authentication functions e.g. 
RSA SecurID Software authenticator [7] which can be downloaded to smartphone and 
provide a two factor authentication. Unfortunately, these software tokens as any soft-
ware application are subject to duplication and one can only be sure that the claimant 
does have the token but not that he/she is the only one. 
4 Mobile identity and strong authentication in the mobile 
network 
 
Fig. 1. GSM authentication 
When subscribing to mobile services, i.e. voice and Short Message Service (SMS) the 
user receives a mobile identity consisting of two identifiers. The phone number, also 
called MSISDN (Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network-Number) is 
a public identifier is used by the user to make and receive phone calls.  The other one, 
IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is a private identifier standardised to 
be recognized by every network in the world and used in the authentication of the 
subscriber. The IMSI is not confidential but should not be diffused too much because 
it reveals the identity of the subscriber and may pose privacy problem. The responsi-
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bility of authenticating the subscriber is assigned to a software application called SIM 
(Subscriber Identity Module) [8]. For protection, the SIM application together with 
the IMSI, credentials such as secret key Ki,  personal identification number (PIN) for 
ordinary use, personal unblocking code (PUK) for PIN unlocking and cryptographic 
functions securely stored in a tamper-resistant integrated circuit called UICC (Univer-
sal Integrated Circuit Card), which is actually the physical module, commonly known 
as SIM card. 
The SIM application combined with the UICC can provide strong two factor au-
thentication with the PIN code as “something you know” factor and the UICC as 
“something you have” factor. As shown in Fig. 1 the strength of the GSM authentica-
tion is ensured by the use of a challenge-response mechanism. Upon power on the 
handset sends an authentication request with its IMSI to the Visitor Location Register 
(VLR) which forwards it to the Home Location Register. The Home Location Regis-
ter (HLR) computes the 32-bit signed response (SRES) based on the encryption of a 
128 bit random number (RAND) with the authentication algorithm (A3) using the 
individual subscriber authentication key (Ki) and send the triplet to the VLR. The 
VLR passes the random number RAND and the ciphering key Kc to the mobile phone 
which delivers them the SIM. The SIM computes the result RES using RAND and Ki, 
and submits it to the VLR. If RES = XRES the mobile phone is authenticated and Kc 
is used for the encryption of the air channel. 
Although rather sophisticated at its invention time the GSM authentication scheme 
does not provide authentication of the mobile network by the mobile phone and ex-
poses the mobile phone for man-in-the-middle attack by rogue base stations. To ad-
dress this weakness, UMTS employs a mutual authentication allowing also the au-
thentication of the 3G network by the handset. As shown in Fig. 2 , the additional 
parameter AUTN enables the verification of the authenticity of the mobile network 
and also the expiration of the response. 
 
 
Fig. 2. UMTS authentication 
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5 From Mobile identity to Mobile Universal identity 
5.1 Definition 
The current Mobile identity as standardised with two identifiers: MSIDN and IMSI 
cannot be used in the Internet and has to be supplemented with one or more Internet 
identifiers. It could be a user name or a uniform resource identifier (URI) such an 
email, e.g.user@telenor.com that can be used for the authentication and authorisation 
of Internet services offered both by the mobile operator and third party service pro-
viders. Another major limitation of the Mobile identity lies in the fact that it is a sub-
scriber identity and not really a user identity. There are many cases where the sub-
scriber is not the user as follows: 
• One subscriber may have multiple subscriptions distributed to multiple users: Typ-
ical example is a company or head of family that pays for a series of subscriptions 
which are distributed for use by employees or family members. 
• One user can have multiple subscriptions and appear like multiple subscribers: 
This is the case of a user having multiple subscriptions for multiple devices: mo-
bile phone, tablet, laptop, home alarm systems, etc.  
We propose to introduce a Mobile Universal identity which is uniquely assigned to a 
user as a human being and lasts as long as the user likes. It must be sufficiently flexi-
ble to allow the inclusion, modification or removal of any mobile identifier or any 
Internet identifier that the user wants.  
These identifiers can have different levels of assurance [9] from level 1 with full 
anonymity to level 4 with registration of user’s name, address, nationality, picture and 
biometrics and the user is given the freedom to decide which identifier for each situa-
tion. 
Since mobile identity, i.e. phone number and IMSI will be used in the authentica-
tion of the user and the user may have more than one it is necessary to have an enrol-
ment process which registers the mobile identity for authentication. The user can run 
the enrolment process whenever he/she wants to change the phone number. 
5.2 Mobile phone Enrolment process 
The enrolment process although sufficiently secure is rather simple as follows: 
1. The user signs on at the Mobile Universal identity provider (which could be the 
mobile operator) Web site using password 
2. He/she enters the number of the mobile phone to be used in the authentication. 
3. Mobile Universal identity provider verifies that the number is legitimate, i.e. in op-
eration and not reported as lost or stolen. 
4. If it is the case the mobile phone can be used and an SMS containing a one-time 
password is sent to the user’s mobile phone.  
5. By entering this one-time password at the Mobile Universal identity provider Web 
site the mobile phone is enrolled as authentication token. 
5.3 User’s requirements 
To be really useful and accepted by the users the Mobile Universal identity must 
fulfil the following requirements: 
1. The user must experience a seamless authentication, i.e. no sign-in required when 
accessing from his/her mobile phone Internet services that do not require high level 
of security, e.g. social networks, net shops, etc. 
2. For Web sites federated with the Mobile Universal identity service provider the us-
er must be able to use his/her Internet identifier for sign in. 
3. For Web sites having their own account, i.e. own user identity the user must be 
able to use strong authentication provided by his/her mobile identity. 
4. The user will be asked to enter pin or select yes when accessing from his/her mo-
bile phone Internet services requiring higher level of security, e.g. governmental 
services, health services, net banks, etc. 
5. The user will be asked to enter pin or select yes when accessing from another de-
vice than his/her mobile phone all Internet services.  
6. The user must be able to use his/her identity at service providers worldwide. 
5.4 Overall architecture  
To realise the Mobile Universal identity fulfilling all the requirements mentioned in 
previous section, the mobile network has to be complemented with additional network 
element as shown in Fig. 3 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The Mobile Universal identity overall architecture 
• Identity Provider (IDP): is in charge of authentication and authorization for In-
ternet services. In order to offer services to a wide range of 3rd party service pro-
viders the IDP supports several technologies and can act as a Liberty Alliance IDP 
[10], OpenID IDP [11], OAuth Authorization server [12]. It is communicating with 
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the Radius server to request SIM or AKA authentication. This IDP can federate 
with other IDP including the ones of other operators to enlarge the usage of the us-
er’s Internet  
• Radius server: This is a standard server that supports the EAP-SIM [13] and EAP-
AKA [14] protocols. It can be used in the authentication of IP devices such as PC, 
Laptop, tablets, etc. 
• MAP gateway: has on one side IP interface and on other side an SS7 interface 
allowing it to communicates with the HLR using the MAP (Mobile Application 
Part) protocol [15]. In fact it is viewed by the HLR as a VLR that sends authentica-
tion requests. 
• WAP gateway: When offering Internet access Most of operators do have a WAP 
(Wireless Application Protocol) [16] gateway that translates Web pages onto ade-
quate formats for mobile phones. For our solution, modifications have to be done 
to make the WAP gateway intercepting all the http requests and redirect to the IDP. 
5.5 Typical use cases 
To clarify how the Mobile Universal identity is working let us now consider a few 
typical use cases. 
Use case 1: Sign on from mobile phone 
1. The user browses on his/her mobile phone and visits a 3rd party Web site 
2. The WAP Gateway intercepts http request and insert the mobile ID (MSISDN) in 
the header 
3. The operator’s WAP gateway redirects browser to Mobile Universal  IDP 
4. The Mobile Universal IDP sends an authentication request containing mobile ID to 
the MAP Gateway 
5. The MAP Gateway forwards the authentication request to the HLR 
6. The HLR returns an  authentication  vector to the operator’s MAP Gateway 
7. The MAP Gateway forwards authentication vector to operator’s IDP 
8. The Mobile Universal IDP sends authentication request with challenge to the us-
er’s mobile phone 
9. The user’s mobile phone sends challenge to SIM card and gets back response 
10. The user’s mobile phone sends response to the Mobile Universal IDP 
11. The Mobile Universal IDP checks the response. If correct the Mobile Universal  
IDP inserts a security assertion in the browser and redirects it back to the 3rd Party 
Web server. 
12. The user gets granted access to 3rd Party Web site without having to type anything. 
Use case 2: Sign on from PC.  
1. The user browses on his/her PC and visits a 3rd party Web site. A sign in page is 
presented. 
2. The user enters his/her username at 3rd Party Web site and clicks on sign on.  
3. The browser on the user’s PC is redirected to the Mobile Universal IDP 
4. The Mobile Universal IDP translates username to mobile ID sends an authentica-
tion request containing mobile ID (MSISDN) to the MAP Gateway 
5. The MAP Gateway forwards the authentication request to the  HLR 
6. The operator’s HLR returns an authentication  vector to the MAP Gateway 
7. The MAP Gateway forwards authentication vector to the Mobile Universal IDP 
8. The Mobile Universal IDP communicates with the Short Message Service Center 
(SMS-C) to send an SMS to the user’s mobile phone. The headers of this SMS en-
sure that the SMS is terminated on the SIM-card on the user’s mobile phone. 
9. On the SIM-card, a SIM Toolkit Application is triggered and a pop up appears in 
the display of the user’s mobile phone. It asks the user if he wants to proceed with 
the authentication.  
10. If the user accepts, an SMS is returned to the Mobile Universal IDP,  
11. The Mobile Universal IDP inserts a security assertion in the browser and redirects 
it back to the 3rd Party Web site. 
12. The user gets granted access to the 3rd Party Web site. 
5.6 Making the identity really universal 
The Mobile Universal identity as described so far can only be used with service pro-
viders that trust the Identity Provider and are hence willing to use the Mobile Univer-
sal identity provided by this IDP. This is typically the case of local service providers 
in one country that build alliance with a national IDP. The IDP together with its ser-
vice providers form a circle of trust in which the user can employ the same identity. 
Unfortunately, such a circle of trust has boundaries and there are certainly service 
providers that belong to other circles of trust. The user cannot use his/her Mobile 
Universal identity with these service providers.  
To enable the usage of the Mobile Universal identity of one circle of trust in anoth-
er one, federation of the two circles of trust has to be done as shown in Fig. 4. Federa-
tion is the exchange of metadata necessary for the mapping of one identity to the oth-
er. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Federation of identities 
There are two federation methods and to explain them let us consider two circles of 
trust N and M with respectively IDPN and IDPM. 
• Federated identifier: When user Nx of Circle of trust N visits a service provider 
SPM2 in Circle of trust M. IDPM acts as a service provider in the Circle of trust N. 
For user Nx an account at IDPN is created and federated both with SPM2 and IdPN. 
• One Time identifier:  The visited SPM2 does not store any local account for the 
user. After being authenticated by the home IDPN user Nx will be authorized by the 
SPM2 A new one-time identifier must be generated at access and the user can use 
her  IDPN  identity. 
For the travelling user accessing from mobile phone the sign-on is seamless as in-
dicated previously in Use case 1. When the user is browsing from her laptop it is a 
little bit more challenging because the Internet identifier might not be recognizable 
for the visited SP. There are two solutions as follows: 
• Universal unambiguous Internet identifier: IDP and SP have to agree on a 
common naming convention for identity that enables the identification of the home 
IDP. 
• User’s assistance: On the visited Web site there should be facility allowing users 
to indicate their origin. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an identity called Mobile Universal identity which can be 
used everywhere in the mobile networks and the Internet. The Mobile Universal iden-
tity is realised by including both mobile identifiers and Internet identifiers. Strong 
authentication is provided by using the mobile identity and the SIM. A proof-of-
concept of the proposed solution has been implemented and tested to ensure feasibil-
ity. Some usability tests have been performed and the sign-on both mobile phones and 
PC are in the range of few seconds which is quite negligible for users. However, to 
really prove the usability of the Universal mobile identity it is necessary to carry field 
trials with real users. A federation trial between multiple circles of trust has also to be 
carried out for validation. Last but not least, to ensure the success and adoption by the 
market it is important to elaborate a sound business model such as for international 
roaming. 
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